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SUMMARY
This paper reports and reflects on the pilot application of an 11-step policy learning protocol that was developed by Cashore and Lupberger 
(2015) based on several years of Cashore’s multi-author collaborations. The protocol was applied for the first time in Peru in 2015 and 2016 by 
the IUFRO Working Party on Forest Policy Learning Architectures (hereinafter referred to as the project team). The protocol integrates insights 
from policy learning scholarship (Hall 1993, Sabatier 1999) with Bernstein and Cashore’s (2000, 2012) four pathways of influence framework. 
The pilot implementation in Peru focused on how global timber legality verification interventions might be harnessed to promote local land 
rights. Legality verification focuses attention on the checking and auditing of forest management units in order to verify that timber is 
harvested and traded in compliance with the law. We specifically asked: How can community legal ownership of, and access to, forestland and 
forest resources be enhanced? The protocol was designed as a dynamic tool, the implementation of which fosters iterative rather than linear 
processes. It directly integrated two objectives: 1) identifying the causal processes through which global governance initiatives might be 
harnessed to produce durable results ‘on the ground’; 2) generating insights and strategies in collaboration with relevant stakeholders. 
This paper reviews and critically evaluates our work in designing and piloting the protocol. We assess what seemed to work well and suggest 
modifications, including an original diagnostic framework for nurturing durable change. We also assess the implications of the pilot application 
of the protocol for policy implementation that works to enhance the influence of existing international policy instruments, rather than contribut-
ing to fragmentation and incoherence by creating new ones. 
Keywords: community rights, durability, illegal logging, legality verification, policy implementation, Peru
Aller vers des solutions durables émanant de groupes de parties prenantes: application pilote 
d’un protocole d’apprentissage politique orienté vers les problèmes inhérents à la vérification de 
la légalité de droits communautaires au Pérou
D. HUMPHREYS, B. CASHORE, I.J. VISSEREN-HAMAKERS, W. DE JONG, K. McGINLEY, A. DENVIR, P. CARO 
TORRES et S. LUPBERGER
Ce papier est un rapport et une réflexion sur l’application pilote d’un protocole d’apprentissage politique en 11 stades, développé par Cashore 
et Lupberger (2015) et basé sur plusieurs années de collaborations avec divers auteurs effectuées par Cashore. Le protocole a été appliqué pour 
la première fois au Pérou en 2015 et en 2016 par l’équipe de travail IUFRO sur les politiques d’apprentissage de l’architecture forestière 
(appelée ensuite l’équipe du projet). Le protocole incorpore des lumières captées par la bourse d’apprentissage politique (Hall1993, Sabatier 
1999) avec les quatre routes de cadres d’influence de Bernstein et de Cashore (2000; 2012). La mise en pratique pilote au Pérou s’est concentrée 
sur la manière dont les interventions de vérification de la légalité du bois à l’échelle mondiale peut être utilisée pour promouvoir les droits à la 
terre locaux. La vérification de la légalité se concentre sur un contrôle et une évaluation des unités de gestion forestière afin de vérifier que le 
bois est récolté et commercialisé en accord avec la loi. Nous avons demandé en particulier: «Comment la propriété communautaire légale et 
l’accès aux terres forestières et à leurs ressources peuvent-elles être accrus?» Le protocole a été créé comme un outil dynamique dont la mise 
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global mechanisms – an endeavour that would risk creating 
a more complex global forest governance architecture with 
increasing areas of duplication and overlap – we argue that 
significant added value can be gained from generating 
creative approaches that foster the enhanced effectiveness of 
existing global interventions. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section out-
lines the origins and evolution of the policy learning protocol, 
which comprises 11 steps. The following section describes 
our methodological approach and the piloting of the protocol 
in Peru. We present the results of the pilot, including some 
reflexive thinking on the design of the protocol following 
stakeholder consultations in Peru. We then present a theoreti-
cal and diagnostic model for durable policy change that 
emerges from our work and which can be integrated into 
future applications of the protocol.
THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE POLICY 
LEARNING PROTOCOL
The policy learning protocol was formally developed by 
Cashore and Lupberger (2015) following several years of 
Cashore’s multi-author collaborations. These efforts were 
en pratique encourage des processus interactifs plutôt que linéaires. Il a intégré directement deux objectifs: 1) une identification des processus 
de causalité par lesquels les initiatives gouvernementales globales peuvent être utilisées pour produire des résultats durables sur le terrain, 
2) une création de visions et de stratégies en collaboration avec les parties prenantes impliquées. Ce papier examine et dresse une évaluation 
critique de notre travail dans la création et la conduite du protocole. Nous examinons ce qui semblait bien marcher et suggérons des modifica-
tions, en incluant un cadre de diagnostique original pour encourager un changement durable. Nous étudions également les implications du 
protocole pour une mise en pratique des politiques aidant à accroître l’influence des instruments politiques internationaux en existence, plutôt 
que de contribuer à une fragmentation et incohérence, en en créant de nouvelles. 
Hacia soluciones duraderas generadas por múltiples partes interesadas: La aplicación piloto de 
un protocolo de aprendizaje de políticas orientado a problemas acerca de la verificación de la 
legalidad de madera y los derechos comunitarios en Perú
D. HUMPHREYS, B. CASHORE, I.J. VISSEREN-HAMAKERS, W. DE JONG, K. McGINLEY, A. DENVIR, P. CARO 
TORRES y S. LUPBERGER
Este articulo informa y reflexiona sobre la aplicación piloto de un protocolo de aprendizaje de políticas de 11 pasos desarrollado por Cashore 
y Lupberger (2015) basado en varios años de colaboraciones de múltiples autores de Cashore. Este protocolo se aplicó por primera vez en Perú 
en 2015 y 2016 por el Grupo de Trabajo sobre las Arquitecturas de Aprendizaje de Políticas Forestales de la IUFRO (en adelante denominado 
‘equipo de proyecto’). El protocolo integra la erudición sobre el aprendizaje de políticas (Hall 1993, Sabatier 1999) con el marco de cuatro vías 
de influencia de Bernstein y Cashore (2000, 2012). La implementación piloto en Perú se centró en cómo las intervenciones globales orientadas 
a la verificación de la legalidad de la madera podrían ser aprovechadas para promover los derechos territoriales locales. La verificación de 
la legalidad de la madera se enfoca en la inspección y auditoría de unidades de manejo forestal para verificar que la madera se cosecha y se 
comercializa de conformidad con la ley. En este trabajo hemos preguntado específicamente: ¿Cómo se puede mejorar la posesión legal y el 
acceso comunitario a los bosques y recursos forestales? El protocolo se diseñó como una herramienta dinámica, cuya implementación fomenta 
procesos iterativos más que lineales. Integra directamente dos objetivos: 1) identificar los procesos causales mediante los cuales las iniciativas 
de gobernanza global podrían aprovecharse para producir resultados duraderos «sobre el terreno»; 2) generar ideas y estrategias en colaboración 
con las partes interesadas pertinentes. Este artículo revisa y evalúa críticamente nuestro trabajo en el diseño y la prueba del protocolo, 
evaluando lo que parecía funcionar bien y sugiriendo modificaciones, incluyendo un marco de diagnóstico original para fomentar cambios 
duraderos. También evaluamos las implicaciones de la aplicación piloto del protocolo para la implementación de políticas enfocadas en el 
mejoramiento de la influencia de los instrumentos internacionales existentes, en lugar de crear otras nuevas políticas que puedan contribuir a la 
fragmentación e incoherencia de la gobernanza global.
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a critical and reflexive overview of the 
design and evolution of a policy learning protocol developed 
by Cashore and Lupberger (2015) that provides a conceptual 
framework that actors can use to harness existing inter national 
sustainable development-related policy mechanisms in order 
to generate innovative strategies to address complex environ-
mental and social problems. The pilot application of the 
protocol took place in Peru in 2015 and 2016. We start from 
the premise that while three decades of global forest policy 
initiatives have generated a range of instruments and organ-
isations, including some success stories, this period of height-
ened political attention on forests has also coincided with 
increased deforestation and forest degradation, especially in 
the tropics, and a worsening of the plight of many forest 
indigenous peoples, including ‘land grabs’ and weakened 
local tenure rights (Humphreys 2006, Maguire 2013). It is 
partly because the international forest policy processes 
created so far have had only limited effectiveness that new 
instruments and organisations are proposed as actors search 
for more effective solutions (Eikermann 2015, Humphreys 
2015). Our approach, however, is very different; rather than 
investing scarce time and resources in the creation of new 
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funded from, and conducted through, several grants and insti-
tutional collaborations including the work of the International 
Union of Forest Research Organisations (IUFRO) and Yale 
University’s Governance, Environment and Markets (GEM) 
initiative. It also draws on earlier work within IUFRO, includ-
ing the Global Forest Expert Panel on the International Forest 
Regime (active throughout 2009–2010) which developed 
the neoinstitutional argument that despite the absence of an 
international forests convention a distinct international forest 
regime complex has emerged as a multicentric, rather than a 
primarily statecentric, entity (Rayner, Buck and Katila 2010). 
This regime complex is a pluralist form of global governance 
that embraces international hard and soft public law, private 
law and a broad diversity of actors. Another IUFRO group 
that contributed to the protocol was the IUFRO Task Force on 
Forest Governance (active throughout 2011–2014), which 
sought to understand how policy learning can advance inter-
national efforts in response to the ‘on the ground’ challenges 
faced by forest communities and policy practitioners. The 
task force reviewed the political science and forest gover-
nance literatures and produced a series of ‘issues and options’ 
papers that provided theoretically-guided insights that actors 
can use when addressing forest sustainability challenges 
(Cashore 2014). Both these IUFRO bodies sought to stimu-
late an interactive dialogue between the forest research com-
munity and actors working on the ground towards effective 
and durable solutions to persistent forest problems. 
Pathways of influence framework
An important theoretical foundation to the work by IUFRO 
and GEM is Bernstein and Cashore’s four pathways of 
influence framework (Bernstein and Cashore 2000, 2012, 
Bernstein, Cashore et al. 2010). This framework highlights 
four causal pathways through which global interventions 
may be harnessed to influence domestic issues and policies to 
‘tip the scales’ toward sustainable and durable results. Each 
pathway – rules, norms, markets and direct access – has dif-
ferent influence logics, with each interacting with the forces 
of economic globalization and sovereignty in different ways:
• The rules pathway focuses on the role of rules and 
agreements – both legally and non-legally binding – in 
shaping policy responses. Examples include the rules 
in international agreements such as the International 
Tropical Timber Agreement, soft international law 
such as the United Nations Forest Instrument1 and cri-
teria and indicators for sustainable forest management. 
• The norms pathway focuses on commonly-accepted 
ways of doing things based on shared social and 
political values. Important norms in forest politics 
include those on human rights, indigenous peoples’ 
rights and community participation. Norms are not 
always top-down or global; local place-bound norms 
and cultural practices also shape accepted understand-
ings of what is considered ‘right’ or ‘desirable’.
• The markets pathway focuses on the role of economic 
incentives and disincentives in creating policy and 
behavioural changes. These include government taxes 
and subsidies, consumer boycotts, timber certification 
and labelling schemes, and the creation of new 
markets (such as carbon). 
• The direct access pathway focuses on how actors can 
achieve influence by, for example, contributing to 
the capacity building of actors through financial and 
technology transfer. Action through this pathway can 
shift power relations and catalyse the building of new 
coalitions.
This framework is a useful tool for exploratory work, as 
it can be used to tease out the complex causal factors that 
explain policy influence in specific cases. By focusing on 
the ways in which various factors might trigger one or more 
pathways of influence, the framework enhances our under-
standing of the comparative advantages among different 
interventions. This orientation requires careful attention when 
identifying causal influence logics to explain the pathways 
through which successful interventions have operated in the 
past, and extrapolating from the historical record the logics, 
ideas and strategies for future interventions. While the four 
pathways are analytically distinct, they often interact in real-
ity. For example, Bernstein (2001) argues that neoliberal 
norms typically prioritise markets over other policy interven-
tions. Bernstein and Cashore (2000, 2012) focus scholarly 
and practitioner attention on the pathways that are more 
dominant or synergistic. Identification of synergies opens up 
creative strategies for fostering lasting and enduring effects. 
All things being equal, an international policy instrument is 
more influential the more pathways through which it operates. 
The policy learning protocol
Drawing on the pathways of influence framework and the 
broader policy learning literature, the protocol is a conceptual 
toolkit that seeks to harness international policy processes to 
promote specific policy objectives. It is inspired by distinct 
literatures from Sabatier (1999) to Hall (1993), both of whom 
find that multistakeholder policy learning is most likely to 
foster some type of policy subsystem change when there is 
general agreement on policy goals, but uncertainty about the 
potential impact of instrument choice, policy mechanisms, 
and policy specifications on one or more problems. (In 
contrast, multistakeholder learning is less likely to lead to 
transformative change when powerful interests, such as those 
causing biodiversity loss, do not accept meaningful conserva-
tion efforts.) The learning protocol was therefore designed for 
a particular set of problems in which goals are not contested, 
but there is a need to generate greater knowledge about the 
1
 Formerly known as the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types on Forests (negotiated by the United Nations Forum on Forests in 2007). 
Renamed the United Nations Forest Instrument by the UNFF in 2015. 
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region was that it is one where several project team members 
enjoy excellent connections with stakeholder groups and 
policy networks. 
Two stakeholder workshops in Lima, Peru were organized 
to gather information, data, and insights on pressing forest 
policy issues from a diverse range of actors, as well as to 
present and receive feedback. The first workshop held in 
Lima on 25 June 2015, attended by 18 local and national-
level stakeholders and five members of the project team 
(Caro, Cashore, Denvir, McGinley and Visseren-Hamakers), 
concentrated on identifying and defining the specific issue to 
be addressed during the piloting of the protocol. It culminated 
with an agreement to focus on enhancing community rights to 
forestland and forest resources in the Peruvian Amazon. 
Throughout the summer and early autumn of 2015 the 
project team collected and analysed information related to the 
problem definition and the socioeconomic context of forestry 
in Peru, and drafted Steps 1–5 based in part on the results 
from the first workshop. A second workshop held in Lima 
on 22 October 2015 was attended by seven members of the 
project team (Caro, Cashore, de Jong, Denvir, Lupberger, 
Judy and Visseren-Hamakers). Participants provided feed-
back on the provisional findings from Steps 1 to 5 and 
debated the type of global instrument that would enhance 
community rights to land and resources using the four path-
ways analytical framework. Project team members assisted 
by students conducted over 100 semi-structured in-person 
and Skype interviews with relevant stakeholders working on 
Peruvian forest policy to gain further insights and informa-
tion. Our drafts were shared with stakeholders online, and 
further feedback sought. The project team ‘met’ regularly on 
Skype to exchange views, discuss next steps and allocate 
workload. As a result, and after scoping various international 
instruments and comparing their relative advantages, we 
selected legality verification (LV) policies for the piloting of 
the protocol.
After drafting of Steps 1 to 10 was nearly complete a final 
round of focused interviews and stakeholder discussions 
was conducted by two project team members (de Jong and 
Humphreys) in Lima from 9–11 March 2016. The insights 
gained from this visit contributed to the drafting of Step 11 
(the playbook). Stakeholders were also asked questions on 
the protocol, its strengths and weaknesses, and how it can be 
further improved. The recorded responses of interviewees 
represented important data in our final draft and in this paper. 
In the next section we acknowledge the inputs of interviewees 
(identified by organisation only so that individual anonymity 
is preserved) by capitalised letters in square brackets, as 
shown in Appendix 1.
After the second day of interviews conducted during the 
March 2016 visit a Skype call was held between the two 
members of the project team in Peru and other project team 
members to discuss preliminary findings and make adjust-
ments to the question strategy before the final day of the visit 
which involved two round table discussions with government 
officials. After the visit Steps 1 to 10 were refined, and 
drafting began on Step 11. The draft analysis was circulated 
for peer review to external evaluators, who provided further 
causal impacts of particular instrument designs and strategic 
choices. The protocol therefore shifts stakeholders’ attention 
from an interest-based, often zero-sum, approach to collec-
tively assessing the causal mechanisms behind a particular 
policy intervention. The idea is that this approach can unleash 
creative tinkering, and even generate broader political 
support, for addressing a specified policy problem.
The protocol is organized around three phases – getting 
ready, co-generating insights, and implementation – encom-
passing 11 distinct steps. While these steps are presented here 
sequentially for easy access, the protocol makes it clear that 
they should be revisited iteratively throughout a project. In the 
first phase – getting ready – an individual or group with an 
understanding of the local context is selected as the knowl-
edge broker (Step 1). Next the problem definition is agreed 
(Step 2) and relevant participants identified (Step 3).
In the second phase – co-generating insights – the prob-
lem definition is classified (Step 4). Information related to 
this problem and the local context is then identified and 
assessed, including gaps in understanding (Step 5). Next, 
the pathways of influence framework is used to analyse the 
causal processes through which global interventions might 
produce desired outcomes and durable results in relation to 
the defined problem (Step 6). This framework is then used to 
focus on selected interventions and their potential impacts 
regarding the problem (Step 7). The comparative advantages 
and disadvantages of these interventions are assessed in terms 
of stakeholder resources and the broader socioeconomic envi-
ronment, with specific interventions selected for addressing 
the issue at hand (Step 8). The selected interventions and 
related instruments are then examined in detail to determine 
opportunities and challenges (Step 9). Then, the causal 
logics of the selected intervention are explored to determine 
strategic insights for addressing the problem (Step 10).
In the third, and final phase – implementation – a play-
book is developed that incorporates strategies and activities 
consistent with the causal logics of the selected interventions 
(Step 11). 
METHODS
Multiple methods were undertaken to apply Cashore and 
Lupberger’s (2015) 11-step protocol in Peru throughout 2015 
and early-2016. These included in-country workshops, in-
person interviews, and consultations with key stakeholders, as 
well as archival data and literature review. An international 
team of forest policy and governance scholars, many of whom 
had participated in related IUFRO and GEM initiatives, was 
assembled to pilot the protocol. Early deliberations focused 
on the case study for the pilot. After some discussion the 
Peruvian Amazon was selected as a tropical forest region that 
faces a range of deforestation and conversion pressures, with 
some deep rooted and protracted conflicts over resource 
access and use (de Jong and Humphreys 2016). The Peruvian 
Amazon is inhabited by some 5,000 communities, of which 
approximately half are recognised as indigenous forest 
communities. A further factor that led to the selection of this 
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comment and insights. The report was concluded in May 
2016 (Cashore, Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2016a, 2016b, 
2016c).
REFLECTIONS ON THE PILOT APPLICATION OF 
THE PROTOCOL IN PERU
In this section, we focus on key lessons and insights from the 
pilot application of the protocol. We stand back and evaluate 
how the process of working through the protocol has changed 
our thinking, and what this suggests for a new approach 
to policy implementation based on the critical application of 
the four pathways of influence framework. We organize this 
section following the steps of the protocol. However, its 
implementation was iterative rather than linear, so that com-
pletion of one step often required revisiting, and sometimes 
revising, an earlier step.
Step 1 Identify a knowledge broker
The role of the knowledge broker is to understand the local 
context and fill in any gaps in knowledge and information in 
relation to the problem that stakeholders wish to address. 
Agreeing on a knowledge broker is therefore an essential first 
step in implementing the protocol. The knowledge broker role 
can be filled by an individual or a group and may be selected 
in different ways (e.g. stakeholder selection). The protocol 
calls for the identification of a knowledge broker who has 
social science and policy analysis training and who can help 
identify the complex causal processes that any particular 
instrument can unleash. For the pilot, the project team self-
selected itself as the knowledge broker.
Interviewees revealed that an essential attribute of an 
effective knowledge broker is their subjective evaluation that 
the individual or group is trustworthy. This is important, since 
forest communities, who are often justifiably suspicious of 
external actors, must view the knowledge broker as capable 
of impartially incorporating a range of knowledge sources, 
including indigenous and local perspectives [B, D, E]. Trust 
may be defined as confidence in the reliability, honesty and 
integrity of an actor. Trustworthiness is an important moral 
resource for the knowledge broker. Our interviewees’ empha-
sis on trust is consistent with theories of negotiation (e.g. 
Fisher and Ury 1991, Zartman and Berman 1982, Kennedy 
1997, Presman 2016) and mediation (Whatling 2012, Moore 
2014). A knowledge broker that lacks trust will find it difficult 
to promote dialogues that solve the problem at hand. 
In addition to trust, interviewees suggested a knowledge 
broker would also need to demonstrate the ability to minimize 
information bias. The question of bias inevitably involves a 
degree of ambiguity. On the one hand, the knowledge broker 
starts from a position of bias, consciously and openly working 
towards an agreed policy outcome, in this case improving the 
tenure rights of forest communities. On the other hand, if 
the knowledge broker is to maintain the trust of all key stake-
holders the broker must be careful not to openly favour some 
actors over others. The work of the knowledge broker is thus 
value laden and normative in terms of the desired policy out-
come, but objective and unbiased in the advice that is given in 
pursuit of that outcome. The knowledge broker must be alert 
to possible sources of bias in the knowledge that is scoped, 
and make this explicit to stakeholders. The broker should also 
make their own biases explicit. Trust and bias are thus inter-
related qualities that have a strong bearing on whether the 
knowledge broker is perceived as having legitimacy. Accord-
ing to Beetham (1991), an actor’s legitimacy depends on the 
extent to which it acts according to commonly-recognised 
rules that are accepted by subordinate groups. Legitimacy 
will also depend on the extent to which the knowledge broker 
understands the culture of the society in question. The legiti-
macy of the knowledge broker will have a direct bearing on 
its effectiveness in addressing the agreed problem.
Additional qualities that our interviewees considered 
important in a knowledge broker included a comprehension 
of the legal and regulatory environment and the ability to 
analyse all dimensions and angles of the problem [C]. The 
knowledge broker must be able to communicate with indi-
viduals and groups at multiple levels and in different contexts 
(e.g. village heads and communal assemblies). The broker 
must identify all issues relevant to the problem [B] and ensure 
that the knowledge exchanged and co-produced during imple-
mentation of the protocol is preserved for future generations 
[D]. For these reasons some interviewees suggested that the 
knowledge broker should understand the cultural context of 
forest communities [C, D]. Our interviewees also stressed that 
such is the broad diversity of actors in forest policy in Peru 
that it is unlikely that any one individual will possess all the 
attributes a broker needs, nor expertise in the full range of 
knowledge required to understand the problem. Interviewees 
also emphasised a point acknowledged in the original proto-
col: as many forest communities have received from external 
actors promises that have not materialised the knowledge 
broker should be careful not to make promises that cannot 
be kept [D].
Step 2 Problem definition
Narrowing in on a specific problem definition is a complex 
process. Under the protocol the problem definition can be 
revisited and revised to accommodate new information and 
objections, as they arise. Following extensive research, 
project team deliberations and stakeholder discussions, we 
settled on the following problem definition:
How can community legal ownership of, and access to, 
forestland and forest resources be enhanced?
Most interviewees declared themselves satisfied with 
this definition and accepted it as relevant and meaningful. 
However, one interviewee noted that some communities are 
sensitive to the word ’legal’: the law is regarded with suspi-
cion and considered ‘threatening’ by some communities as 
it can be used to grant legal title to actors from outside the 
forest [B]. The project team responded that the intention of 
the problem formulation is to promote legal processes that 
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uphold community rights, not those that would usurp such 
rights. One interviewee suggested we focus primarily on the 
needs and rights of forest communities, which includes, but is 
not limited to, ‘legal’ rights [D]. We became acutely aware 
that concepts such as ‘legality’ can mask important conflicts 
of interests and that care needs to be taken in the vocabularies 
used in the problem definition. 
Step 3 Identifying the relevant participants for 
co-generating insights
Step 3 is guided by scholarship on multistakeholder policy 
learning processes, which underscores the effectiveness of 
bringing together like-minded organizations and individuals 
to foster shared learning and identify synergistic opportuni-
ties for achieving shared objectives. The project team was 
purposeful in identifying the full range of relevant stakehold-
ers, including government agencies, businesses, donors, envi-
ronmental NGOs, indigenous peoples and local communities. 
We were mindful that a balance needed to be struck between 
comprehensiveness (inviting an exhaustive list of all possible 
stakeholders) and effectiveness (not overloading the consulta-
tion process so that many actors would have no real opportu-
nity to make their voices heard). Here it is worth noting a 
qualitative distinction between consultation and participation. 
Consultation carries with it only the understanding that views 
may be expressed. However, participation must involve a 
genuine opportunity for stakeholders to interact with each 
other and influence outcomes. 
In addition, because our scoping of problem definitions 
focused on biodiversity and indigenous land rights, our first 
meeting necessarily emphasised organizations whose work 
and interest included one or both of these problems. Consis-
tent with the protocol, other actors, which might be tapped 
into for strategic coalition building, were brought in at a later 
phase. Feedback from our interviewees suggests that the 
participants who accepted our invitations to the stakeholder 
workshops covered the main stakeholder groups, all of whom 
could participate meaningfully. Hence we conclude that the 
workshops struck a balance not only between comprehensive 
and effective participation, but also necessary exclusion 
during the first meeting to refine problem definitions.
Step 4 Classify the problem
A key innovation in Step 4 of the protocol developed by 
Cashore and Lupberger (2015) is that it points stakeholders 
and scholars towards classifying the problem at hand accord-
ing to three types: win-win (Type 1); win-lose compromise 
(Type 2); or win-lose hierarchy (Type 3).2 Type 1 outcomes 
involve the generation of mutual gains, such as overcoming 
traditional ‘tragedy of the commons’ type problems when 
everyone is better off when resource depletion is avoided. 
With Type 2 outcomes, compromise occurs. The protocol 
makes it clear that stakeholders will need to adjudicate – 
based on a range of knowledge, including the science on the 
problem itself, as well as other relevant sources – how they 
want to classify the problem at hand. For example, most 
domestic land use designation approaches tend implicitly to 
involve compromises between different land uses (Cashore, 
Visseren-Hamakers  et al. 2016a, 2016b). Type 3 outcomes 
also involve win-lose outcomes, with addressing one issue 
leading to trade-offs with others. Here, however, the problem 
in question involves some type of hierarchy, with some issues 
designated as more important than others. If species extinc-
tions and climate change are to be addressed, then stakehold-
ers must assign them Type 3 status, since trading them off 
against other issues could result in risky compromises while 
failing to address the core policy problem. Categorizing 
problems hence involves taking into account what science 
tells us about the problems (for example, the risk of species 
extinction), while also requiring subjective evaluations on 
the part of those making decisions. When problems are 
multidimensional, different dimensions of a problem may be 
classified in different ways.
The pilot implementation of the protocol in Peru confirms 
that it may not always be possible to arrive at an unambiguous 
categorisation of a problem within, and across, stakeholders 
for two reasons. First, and consistent with the protocol, 
problem definition is inevitably a matter of subjectivity, 
and different actors may have very different socially-situated 
perceptions. Second, very similar problems may play out 
differently in different social and cultural spaces. That said, 
we concluded that in most cases land titling for forest 
communities in Peru is a Type 2 problem, as a gain in tenure 
rights for a forest community will represent a loss of rights for 
another actor, such as the state, a private owner or, maybe, 
another forest community.
One of our interviewees argued that the formalization of 
land tenure rights for communities may not necessarily be 
seen as a gain; it could be seen as a setback if customary 
claims were recognized only partially rather than in full [D]. 
Legal recognition of tenure rights can also be seen as a 
double-edged sword (for example, if tenure rights were 
granted to a private business rather than a local community). 
The pilot implementation underscored that problem 
definitions should not be considered fixed, as unrealised gains 
may exist. For example, a problem may be seen by some 
actors as a Type 2 problem, but hitherto unrecognised win-
win outcomes exist that have not yet been identified. Such 
a possibility is presented below where, it is suggested, 
two actors that may previously have seen themselves in a 
hierarchical zero-sum game situation (Type 3), namely forest 
communities and timber businesses, may be able to find a 
new collaborative model that generates a win-win scenario 
(Type 1).
2
 These distinctions were first drawn by Cashore, 2013. 
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Step 5 Scoping knowledge of the problems at hand
This step encompasses the scoping of a broad range of knowl-
edge that can aid in understanding the problem (including, 
for example, Sears and Pinedo-Vasquez 2011, Pacheco et al. 
2016). When piloting the protocol, we scoped knowledge on 
the history of indigenous property rights in Peru, the role of 
forests in livelihoods in Peru and the causes of deforestation 
and forest degradation. We invited comments from our inter-
viewees on the knowledge scoped, and any knowledge gaps 
and uncertainties. Our interviewees stressed the importance 
of this step, with one noting that effective knowledge scoping 
is necessary to strengthen the interface between knowledge 
and politics [D]. The same interviewee stressed the need 
for more knowledge on how the decentralization process 
underway in Peru can be managed in order to strengthen 
community land tenure.
It was also noted there is a shortage of empirical research 
on how land titling and legal changes may improve liveli-
hoods [B]. It was stressed that forest communities should be 
free to decide whether they wish to accept knowledge from 
actors outside the forest; some communities may be opposed 
to this, while others would welcome more training on their 
legal rights and intellectual property [C]. It was noted that 
training could reduce the dependence of forest communities 
on external actors, which is especially important for younger 
members of communities on whom the responsibilities will 
lie in the future [C]. 
An important knowledge gap identified related to illegal 
operators at the margins of the forestry sector who are most 
likely to shift to legal timber production if adequately incen-
tivized [A]. Illegal operators are deeply entrenched in Peru; 
some are criminals while others are business people whose 
involvement in the illegal trade is due to opportunistic rea-
sons. One interviewee noted that there is insufficient evidence 
on what the costs of compliance with legality verification 
schemes would be for legal operators, and the benefits that 
would accrue from this [A]. There is thus a veil of uncertainty 
on who the winners and losers would be from a shift to legal 
production. This relates to an important causal influence 
logic: as long as the potential benefits of weeding out illegal 
timber are perceived as higher than the costs of compliance, 
most timber companies will perceive a self-interest in helping 
build tracking systems that enable market chains of legally-
produced timber. However, if the costs of compliance 
increase, or if additional requirements are placed on legal 
regimes, then companies may be less inclined to participate. 
This could hinder the emergence of tracking systems for legal 
timber production.
Step 6 Apply the pathways of influence framework
In Step 6, the pathways of influence framework is used to 
identify the causal pathways through which global interven-
tions might influence domestic challenges through laws, 
norms, markets and direct access. Application of the frame-
work seeks to add value to, rather than substitute, existing 
policy analysis efforts by untangling the promise and pitfalls 
of international interventions within domestic contexts. 
The framework was welcomed by interviewees, although 
it was suggested that it may not be easily understood in forest 
communities; the terminology is new and actors will need 
time to accustom to it [A, D]. It was noted that forest com-
munities would be unlikely to read the protocol, but those 
who advise them would, and a key challenge was to demon-
strate the relevance of the protocol to communities [A, B]. We 
asked how the protocol could be rendered more accessible for 
forest communities. One suggestion was for communication 
to take place in communities using local cultural symbols and 
traditional knowledge that has locally-grounded meaning for 
communities. Examples include the sun, trees and local bird 
species [D]. Using local meanings can help to render external 
knowledge intelligible to communities who may otherwise be 
suspicious of external actors.
Two recurring themes arose in our interviews on the path-
ways framework and its application during the pilot. First, 
interviewees stressed the need for stronger international rules 
on the protection of forest communities and their environ-
ments [A, C]. The key thing here is not simply the promulga-
tion of rules, but their internalisation by actors so that they 
affect actor behaviour and social practices (Cashore, Visseren-
Hamakers et al. 2016a, p.57; Steinberg 2015). The second 
theme related to the need for capacity building through the 
direct access pathway. The role of Interpol in training customs 
officers to address illegal logging in Peru was welcomed by 
the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) who have 
been cooperating and sharing intelligence with Interpol [A]. 
EIA also work with AIDESEP (the Interethnic Association 
for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest) to support 
the Veeduria Forestal system under which EIA provides tech-
nical support for a pilot that will empower communities to 
negotiate better contracts with loggers [A]. It was noted that 
capacity building was needed so that forest communities can 
negotiate on equal terms with forest businesses and other 
actors [B, G]. Capacity building can thus be a trigger for 
durable change. A further problem is the need for better coor-
dination amongst donors in order to make sure that aid yields 
the most optimum results [E]. 
Another common issue that arose in almost all interviews 
was the notion of corruption. Some government officials we 
interviewed openly acknowledged that bribe taking to avoid 
government regulations was a problem [F, G]. In this respect 
corruption may be seen as the opposite of capacity building; 
whereas capacity building may enhance oversight of the 
forest sector (either by publicly accountable authorities or by 
civil society actors), corruption erodes public oversight over 
public goods. 
Step 7 Scope policy pathways for intervening
Step 7 builds from the reflective analysis of Step 6 by utilising 
the pathways framework to examine international policy 
processes that may be harnessed to address the problem. 
From the available policy instruments we selected three: 
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of REDD+, which has been the dominant international forest 
policy option for some time now. Consequently, we judged 
that only limited added value would be leveraged in applying 
the protocol to this option. ZND has the advantage that the 
Peruvian government has declared its support for the idea. 
However, it suffers an opposite problem to REDD+: it is so 
new and underdeveloped that for now little can be expected of 
it without significant investment of resources. 
LV is an instrument that has garnered significant support 
from some important actors, both timber producers and 
importers. It has been studied to some degree but not exhaus-
tively. As a policy it is at a relatively early stage in Peru. 
Therefore, decisions made in the next few years may have 
significant influence in shaping the impacts of LV. Its focus 
on improved enforcement of domestic laws reinforces, rather 
than challenges, domestic sovereignty. Through the markets 
pathway, LV also presents potential support for, and synergies 
with, other international and national policies focusing on 
reducing deforestation and forest degradation. These factors 
led us to select it as the instrument to focus on in Peru.
Our interviewees agreed that LV has significant promise 
in Peru and tropical forest countries. However, officials at 
MINAM queried why we excluded REDD+ and ZND to 
focus solely on legality verification; it was suggested that we 
had created an unnecessary choice, and that the protocol 
could be adapted to treat REDD+, ZND and legality verifica-
tion as complementary, rather than mutually exclusive, 
options [G]. We responded that for the pilot implementation 
of the protocol we wished to enable clear causal analysis by 
focusing on one instrument (independent variable) and one 
problem (dependent variable), and that introducing two 
independent variables during the pilot would complicate the 
analysis. However, it may be possible to amend the scope of 
the protocol to enable causal analysis of more than one instru-
ment in future applications, including the synergies between 
them. Synergies with REDD+ could be especially important, 
as in terms of finance it remains the dominant international 
process influencing domestic forest reforms.
Step 9 Identify instruments and interventions to be 
pursued
In Step 9 we analysed LV in detail, considering its current 
applications and various forms and the theoretical implica-
tions for further developments in Peru. Our reflective learning 
during this step points to the need for a revised instrument 
design that explicitly links timber production with local liveli-
hoods. The strategy we propose is for actors to work through 
the rules pathway by adding social safeguards to existing 
LV policies so that respect for land tenure rights becomes an 
integral component of LV. 
The question then becomes twofold. First, which LV 
policies should be targeted as likely to yield the most effective 
results? Second, how should social safeguards be added 
to these instruments? Answering these questions requires 
teasing out the strategic implications of adding safeguards 
to the LV policies that we reviewed. Adding safeguards to the 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degrada-
tion (REDD+), Zero Net Deforestation (ZND), and Legality 
Verification (LV). All were then analysed for their current and 
potential future influence.
All three interventions work, or could work, through all 
four pathways. REDD+ is a climate change mitigation policy 
developed under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). REDD+ includes safeguard 
rules relevant to forest communities and their rights; is 
consistent with norms respecting indigenous rights; works 
through market mechanisms; and involves direct access inter-
ventions from governmental and non-governmental donors 
working with communities.
ZND is an emerging policy idea based on the principle 
that actors should publicly commit to a policy of no net 
deforestation by an agreed date. The idea has potential, but is 
relatively new and underdeveloped. Depending on how it 
develops, it could draw for legitimacy from existing interna-
tional rules. Similarly, actors promoting ZND could invoke 
international norms on conservation and human rights. 
Another avenue the idea could take is a market mechanism, 
perhaps similar to timber certification and labelling schemes. 
Some actors such as World Wide Fund for Nature and the 
Rainforest Foundation are working with local communities 
on capacity building utilising the direct access pathway to 
achieve ZND (Cashore, Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2016a, 
p.69).
Legality verification (LV) schemes include the amended 
Lacey Act in the United States, the forest annex of the U.S.-
Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, the EU Timber Regulation 
(EUTR) and Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) under 
the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
(FLEGT) action plan. LV is in essence a market-based instru-
ment. In terms of the rules pathway, LV instruments place the 
responsibility for defining legality and illegality with produc-
ing countries. With respect to the norm pathway, LV schemes 
reinforce international norms against corruption and illegali-
ty, as well as respect for community land rights. Finally, the 
direct access pathway is leveraged through capacity-building 
initiatives for LV processes and technologies, with support 
from some powerful governments, including the U.S. and EU 
countries. 
Our interviewees agreed with the logic of Step 7 and our 
analysis, but again stressed that for some forest communities 
the framework may not be immediately intuitive and that 
external help would be needed in rendering it intelligible for 
communities [A, B, C, D]. We agree, and maintain that this 
should be a requisite skill for the knowledge broker.
Step 8 Assessing comparative advantage
With Step 7 having narrowed down the range of instruments 
to the three with the highest potential for influencing the 
problem identified, Step 8 involved a systemic assessment of 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the ‘short-listed’ 
interventions: REDD+, ZND and LV. 
We argued that considerable political activity, economic 
resources and scholarly debate have been deployed in support 
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the potential for added safeguards to enhance community 
legal ownership of, and access to, forestland and forest 
resources. An important logic identified in our work is the 
need for alliances between actors who may not previously 
have collaborated. We are interested as to why broad coali-
tions may emerge in support of LV, since such explanations 
will enable us to understand how legality verification efforts 
might be used for different forest problems. Legality verifica-
tion efforts to weed out illegal timber tend to gain support by 
appealing to disparate interests, such as environmental groups 
seeking to stop illegal practices; legal timber harvesters seek-
ing to gain resource rents by reducing competition with illegal 
timber; and governments interested in creating incentives for 
sustainable forest management. Crucially, our focus here is 
not so much on how to eliminate the worst practices through 
tougher laws, improved governance arrangements for forest 
permits, improved enforcement and legal penalties (important 
though these efforts are), but on how to nurture best practice. 
There appears to be a two-phase process through which 
legality verification may be institutionalised and nurtured 
(Cashore and Stone 2012). First, a range of different actors 
recognize the problem at hand and cooperate to develop a 
strategic operational response to it. In the case of LV, these 
actors may include law-abiding businesses with an interest in 
fostering the legal trade and actors who are prepared to shift 
from illegal to legal production if the conditions are right. 
This phase would see the introduction of supply chain track-
ing systems. In the second phase, with a coalition of support 
established and LV accepted as routine, standards can be 
raised further. 
The distinction between these two phases can be under-
stood in terms of the inter-relationship between feasibility 
(what can practically be achieved at any given time, given 
prevailing social and political conditions) and desirability 
(what policy proponents wish to achieve based on the norms 
and values that guide human behavior and social life). In the 
case of illegal logging, these norms relate to the environment 
and human rights. Feasibility can be shifted over time by 
political action: during the first phase when forest manage-
ment standards are lower political support can be accrued, 
which in turn changes what is feasible in the second phase. In 
this way, standards can be ‘ratcheted up’ over time (Cashore 
et al. 2007).
How may such a strategy be operationalised in Peru? 
Some of our interviewees told us that the scope for creating 
a broad coalition in Peru that involved government, illegal 
and legal operators, environmental groups and indigenous 
peoples was limited, with some key actors, in particular forest 
businesses and environmentalists, unwilling to talk to each 
other. It was suggested that such a coalition was unlikely to 
come about unless actors with convening power, such as the 
government, were prepared to act as a mediator [A]. One 
actor that could convene such a coalition is the exporters’ 
agency ADEX (the Administración de Negocios Internacio-
nales, or International Business Administration). 
A further problem relates to the demand-side of the 
market. Low demand for legally-verified timber within 
Peru will make the formation of coalitions and the adding of 
amended Lacey Act was seen as problematic by one inter-
viewee, as the amendment only just survived resistance from 
opponents in Congress [A]. Adding safeguards to the EU 
Timber Regulation could be problematic for similar reasons; 
the EUTR was agreed only after a lengthy legislative process, 
and amending it is likely to be time consuming and cumber-
some. There are some hints of social safeguard intentions in 
the U.S.-Peru TPA, but its implementation and impacts have 
been mixed, with renegotiation or amendments unlikely any 
time soon. 
If amendment of legal instruments is not the most feasible 
short-term option, there are two further possibilities. The 
first is for the agreement of operational safeguards to which 
government agencies and other actors should adhere when 
implementing the instrument, similar to World Bank opera-
tional safeguards. While these safeguards may not have legal 
standing, they would establish standards that would change 
behaviour through demand-side action. Such safeguards 
would not only operate through the rules pathway: if imple-
mented they would help ensure that timber harvested accord-
ing to rules that respect community land rights is traded 
through the markets pathway, thus upholding the norm of 
community land rights. Furthermore, actors working through 
the direct access pathway would be expected to adhere to such 
safeguards. Action through the rules pathway could therefore 
cascade into the other three pathways.
A second way that rules on community land rights can be 
established is codification through the courts. Taking the 
amended Lacey Act as an example: should legal prosecution 
of a business that violated the Act take place it may be possi-
ble for safeguards on community tenure rights to be included 
in the prosecution case and subsequently upheld in the courts. 
In this view, judicial rather than political safeguards may offer 
the best prospects for success. A similar argument can be 
made for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement 
of 2016. The TPP has a legality clause that prohibits interna-
tional trade in illegal goods. Amendment of this recently-
adopted agreement is most unlikely, but a court case brought 
under it could, in principle, result in a ruling that includes 
tenure rights. 
A VPA through the FLEGT program might be the most 
efficient path for pursuing ‘LV + safeguards’, both for titling 
and for the broader array of community rights. A VPA might 
also come with stronger market signals. Admittedly no Latin 
American country has concluded a VPA. But experiences 
from Asia and Africa provide insights into the opportunities 
and potential pitfalls of the VPA mechanism. The process of 
agreeing VPAs in Asia and Africa has usually started with 
stakeholder deliberations on what constitutes legal timber 
felling, thus opening up political space within which the 
tenure rights of forest communities can be introduced 
(Humphreys 2016). 
Step 10 Develop clearly identified causal logics
Step 10 explores empirically and theoretically the causal 
logics of the selected instrument in relation to the problem. 
Following Step 9 we considered the causal logics of LV and 
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The causal expectation here is that once a secure supply 
chain of legally-logged timber is established, legality stan-
dards can be ‘ratcheted up’ over time through state-supported 
conversion towards legal business practices. A further way in 
which it makes sense to think of phased standard raising over 
time is forest community rights. A first phase could establish 
the notion of community rights in a broader sense, focusing 
initially on ‘selective logging rights’ as suggested by our 
AIDESEP and GIZ (German Corporation for International 
Development) interviewees. Because this would require a 
change to the law, the building of a coalition of support would 
be necessary. Once these rights are established, with timber 
selectively logged from forest communities entering the 
market, a second phase would see a push from the coalition 
for a ‘ratcheting up’ of rights to include land tenure rights. 
This would involve demand side action through the markets 
pathway reinforced by international rules and safeguards 
on indigenous rights (such as ILO Convention 169). This 
scenario would, in effect, tolerate some illegal businesses, 
but only those prepared to shift to the legal trade, and only for 
the short term. By contrast, trying to enforce tough legality 
standards, especially on illegal operators wishing to convert 
to the legal trade, could lead to support for LV leaching away 
as actors were deterred by the risk of legal penalties. 
An important point is the high risk of investing in forests 
for legal businesses [F, G]. The interest paid on loans for 
buying heavy equipment and the costs of building roads can 
be prohibitively high and may make it impossible for legal 
operators to make a profit. Illegal operators, by contrast, are 
better able to afford these costs through tax evasion, worker 
exploitation and neglecting health and safety standards. 
According to an official from OSINFOR (the government’s 
Supervisory Body of Forest Resources and Wildlife), the 
state could play an important role in mitigating the risks that 
legal operators face by providing low interest loans that entice 
legal businesses to enter the market. Such a scheme has been 
tried in Colombia [F]. The state can thus play a vital role in 
promoting action through the markets pathway through low 
interest loan provision that provides economic incentives for 
durable change.
Step 11 Develop a Strategic Playbook
The final step of the protocol is the development of a strategic 
playbook from which stakeholders can draw in their efforts to 
address the problem at hand. It should be stressed that in line 
with the ethos of continual learning that underlies our work 
the playbook should be seen as a living and evolving docu-
ment that is able to respond to new evidence, knowledge 
and ideas.
From our work in Step 10 we elaborated two key strategic 
proposals that could be pursued through legality verification 
3
 Selective logging is the forest management practice of felling certain selected trees in a forest management unit, while leaving the remainder 
standing. The intention is to minimise, or even eliminate, the long term impacts on the ecological system (Asner et al. 2005, Uhl and 
Guimarães Vieira 1989).
additional safeguards especially challenging. Despite this, 
two interviewees noted that potential exists for an alliance 
between communities wishing to selectively log their forests 
and legal timber operators [B, G]. Significantly, AIDESEP 
supports the selective logging of community forests for the 
legal trade [C].3 It was noted that the conditions for such 
an alliance are not yet in place, but could be created with 
changes to the law. At present forest communities must apply 
for a logging permit (just like other actors) if they wish to 
log their forests. Gaining the permit is time intensive and 
bureaucratic, and if a permit is denied communities have two 
options; to be denied loss of income from their forests; or to 
log illegally. AIDESEP has proposed that the law be changed, 
with forest communities allowed to log selectively without a 
permit if approval is given by the village communal assembly 
(the highest legal authority in a village) and the village head 
[C]. This would also have the advantage of relieving some 
of the bureaucratic and administrative costs of applying for 
permits that timber businesses currently face. Legal operators 
and communities could thus gain financially in two important 
respects: reducing their costs; and gaining increased market 
share as illegal operators are squeezed out. Depending on 
price elasticity, businesses could also gain if a price premium 
could be earned through increased demand-side pull from 
countries with a LV policy, primarily the U.S. and EU. 
An alliance between legal operators and forest communi-
ties could reframe the problem as Type 1 (Step 4), generating 
a win-win outcome for forest communities and businesses. 
Legal operators would gain a secure supply of legally-
recognised timber, putting pressure on illegal operators, while 
forest communities would have a direct stake in their forests 
and gain a more secure income stream. As well as requiring 
a change in the law, some capacity building would be needed 
to create such a coalition (the direct access pathway). For 
example, forest communities do not yet have the training to 
draw up forest management plans or engage in select logging. 
One interviewee from the Ministry of the Environment 
(MINAM) suggested legality verification could involve busi-
nesses adopting an adaptation plan, with a phased conversion 
to legality over, say, four to five years. The adaptation plan 
should involve verifiable benchmarks [G]. While the adapta-
tion plan was being adhered to companies should be encour-
aged to continue with their reforms, rather than penalised for 
any infractions with tough penalties. It was also noted that a 
state crackdown on hard core illegal operators would create 
a shortfall of timber for sale. This would increase prices, 
thus incentivising more legal operators to enter the market. 
However, without cheaper loans, investing in the forest sector 
would remain high risk for legal operators. If, however, these 
operators could obtain legal timber from communities, the 
market shortfall of legal timber could be made up. 
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schemes for enhancing community legal ownership of, 
and access to, forestland and forest resources, namely intro-
ducing strong social safeguards to LV policies, and selective 
legal logging from community forests (Cashore, Visseren-
Hamakers et al. 2016c). We now consider each of these in 
more detail.
Social safeguards 
Safeguards can both constitute legitimating language as well 
as steer actor behaviour and financial flows. We theorise 
that if social safeguards based on norms that promote legal 
security for all forest users were incorporated in international 
LV rules, they could leverage enhanced community land 
titling and security. We reason that this could occur because 
safeguards would not only nurture the markets pathway 
through demand-side incentives, but also help stakeholders 
generate technical and financial support (the direct access 
pathway), especially if this enables communities to apply for, 
and realise, community forest land claims. This result, in turn, 
could be durable, as it would bring additional stability to the 
forest sector.
Through this policy learning process, we identified the 
incorporation and implementation of social safeguards in a 
possible future FLEGT VPA between Peru and the EU as a 
prospective strategy for enhancing forest community rights. 
Learning from earlier VPA processes in other countries, 
and how they came to include social safeguards, allows us to 
identify promising ideas. The VPA process, by fostering 
cross-country and stakeholder collaboration, provides more 
opportunities for influencing outcomes than many other 
international and bilateral LV processes. 
How then, might stakeholders help promote the inclusion 
of social safeguards in a future Peru-EU VPA? One idea is for 
Peruvian stakeholders to build on the potential for multiple 
benefits from enhanced community rights by developing a 
national coalition of like-minded actors. This group could 
link to international coalitions, including NGOs and develop-
ment cooperation agencies, involved in earlier VPA processes 
in order to learn from earlier experiences while limiting 
potential pitfalls. 
This assumes that the Peruvian government is willing to 
develop a VPA with social safeguards through a multistake-
holder process. We reason that the Peruvian government is 
more likely to support international rules on LV when the 
standards and safeguards reinforce, rather than detract from, 
national sovereignty. And if ‘LV + safeguards’ ultimately 
helps the government address existing forest issues, including 
communal forestland titling, then the conditions would be 
in place for a broad-based coalition of support. Admittedly 
generating international policies that reinforce domestic 
sovereignty is often a difficult balancing act. However, the 
protocol can be used to identify strategies for walking this 
‘tightrope’ by placing attention on coalition building on the 
one hand, and important substantive outcomes on the other. 
Selective legal logging from community forests
One proposal that would enhance community rights over 
forestlands while enabling community logging is to broaden 
the Major Land Use Capacity categories of Peru’s Regula-
tions on Land Classification. A new land-use category could 
be introduced called ‘Indigenous Lands’ or, alternatively, 
‘Communal Forestry Lands’. This new designation would be 
applied to an aggregated cluster of communities, including 
forest communities and ribereño communities. It would not 
grant property rights, but would instead specify that the 
area under the category is designated exclusively for com-
munity or smallholder forest exploitation. This would include 
selective logging. 
A related proposal is to expand the number and area 
of ‘municipal conservation areas’ adjacent to or surrounding 
indigenous and ribereño communities. Municipal conserva-
tion areas are less restricted in the use of natural resources. 
Hence, communities and municipal governments, along with 
the regional government’s forest administration, could coop-
erate to devise municipal conservation area management 
plans that include communal timber exploitation. In both 
of these cases, the policy reforms could be expected to help 
generate community production of legal timber, a key condi-
tion for creating the durable coalitions of communities and a 
stable forest sector, as discussed above. 
A complementary idea for policy change, proposed by 
PROFONANPE (a Peruvian not-for-profit environmental 
fund) is to modify the highly technical process of preparing 
a forest management and annual logging operation plan with 
a process that emphasises intrinsic local community knowl-
edge. Such a communal forest management plan would 
define where logging is desirable, the short-, medium- and 
long-term goals, and the precise species and volumes to be 
logged. These proposals would need careful testing to refine 
procedures and implementation to ensure that community 
organizations are directly involved in, and beneficiaries of, 
logging activity. Combined, these strategic approaches, which 
should be seen as complementary and interlinked, have the 
potential to remove the bottlenecks that many local communi-
ties face in participating in, and benefiting from, the forest 
economy. 
So far this paper has considered the development of the 
policy learning protocol, and how the piloting of it generated 
some innovative policy proposals for enhancing community 
land rights by working through international legality verifica-
tion instruments. In the next section we outline how the 
piloting of the protocol has also enabled us to think reflex-
ively about the conceptual basis of durability and how it can 
be theorised and operationalised within the four pathways 
framework. 
A DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK FOR NURTURING 
DURABLE CHANGE
The notion of durability is central to the protocol. We are 
interested in enabling interventions that will generate long-
lasting results. The piloting of the policy learning protocol 
throughout 2015 and 2016 stimulated the development of 
an analytical framework that serves two functions: as a 
theoretical framework on durability for scholars and policy 
Towards durable multistakeholder-generated solutions  289
practitioners; and as a diagnostic framework that actors can 
use when scoping out possible interventions for enhancing 
the effectiveness of international policy interventions. The 
framework thus serves two key functions, contributing both 
to policy scholarship and policy practice. It is proposed that 
actors using the protocol apply the framework outlined 
below when working through Step 6 (apply the pathways 
of influence framework); and Step 7 (scope policy pathways 
for intervening). 
Our work reveals that the problems associated with legal-
ity verification in Peru are not only due to a lack of law, but 
also to problems of implementing existing law [B, D]. In the 
case of community land rights the granting of legal tenure in 
Peru has thus far not taken place under current legislation. 
Whether the problem is due to legislative gaps (suggesting the 
need for new legislation), or better implementation of existing 
legislation, the fact is that the vast majority of important 
decisions are made at the domestic and subnational levels by 
state officials and other actors. Economic globalization 
through the four pathways can open up political space that can 
be used to contest national policy, but sovereignty remains 
important, with final decision making authority resting 
with the state. Our interviewees stressed that while the actions 
suggested by the protocol are helpful, broader structural 
constraints at the domestic level also need addressing, in 
particular addressing forest crime, tackling corruption and 
streamlining the decentralization process. In this section 
we present a diagnostic framework that can be developed and 
applied by actors seeking to identify the most important 
domestic constraints to more effective policy reforms. 
The notion of durability implies persistence and resilience 
over time, hence a durable outcome should be conceptualised 
as one that has a reproducing logic to it. Durable change 
may take place quickly and suddenly, or it may take place 
gradually over time in small steps.
Interventions that travel through the four pathways of 
influence will not always have the desired effect as they will 
encounter, and be mediated through, various intervening vari-
ables. A durable policy is one that is able to withstand erosion 
over time from those intervening variables that act against the 
aims of the policy. For example, an intervening variable in 
Peru that may thwart efforts to secure indigenous land titling 
is the pressure from business corporations and politicians 
to convert forests to alternative land uses, such as industrial 
agriculture or mining. 
International policies rarely ‘arrive’ intact in a policy 
space as they invariably collide with, and are shaped by, local 
realities. It is thus necessary to identify those intervening vari-
ables that may enhance or, alternatively, weaken durability. 
The framework enables this. In Figure 1 the independent 
variable is broadly drawn as ‘International policy’ and the 
dependent variable as ‘Formulation and implementation of 
domestic policy’. A number of intervening variables are also 
shown. These variables are indicative only: the framework 
will need refining and adapting according to the specific 
problem being addressed and the local political, economic, 
social and cultural factors that have a bearing upon it. The 
feedback loop in Figure 1 represents the monitoring and eval-
uation of international policy processes – both formally by 
publicly-accountable bodies and informally by communities 
FIGURE 1 A diagnostic framework: using the four pathways of influence to build durable outcomes
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and other civil society actors – and how actors may respond 
to this at the national level.
The intervening variables shown in Figure 1 are not 
exhaustive, and will vary over time (at different stages of the 
policy process) and space (playing out differently in different 
regions and countries). Hence, an essential part of the applica-
tion of this framework is identifying the intervening variables 
that impact upon different forest spaces at different times, and 
analysing how they may interact with the four pathways. 
Intervening variables may be divided into:
• enabling: those variables that support and enhance 
the policy objective, leading in this case to ‘more’ 
community land titling
• impeding: those variables that thwart and impede the 
policy objective, leading in this case to ‘less’ commu-
nity land titling. 
Particularly important in this framework are the nodes of 
interaction between the four pathways and the intervening 
variables. An important analytical point for the knowledge 
broker to consider, therefore, is what action can be taken to 
build durability at these nodes. 
A policy that lacks durability is one that over several 
iterations:
• is weakened by the impeding intervening variables. 
In such circumstances these variables have a stronger 
influence, perhaps due to the exercise of political and 
economic power by those who oppose or resist the 
policy, or perhaps because the policy collides with 
local norms. In this case, such variables may be seen 
as the local on the ground ‘realities’ with which propo-
nents of community land titling must grapple and seek 
to overcome. 
• does not interact productively with the enabling inter-
vening variables to generate the desired outcomes. 
These may be factors that proponents of the policy 
have failed to recognise or exploit. One example might 
be a potentially supportive regulation that has not been 
recognised or invoked.
A durable policy, by contrast, is one that over several 
iterations:
• is able to transform or overcome the impeding inter-
vening variables and thus reduce conflicts in the 
political system, in this case increasing the opportuni-
ties for community land titling. One example identi-
fied in this paper is a potential coalition between two 
actors who thus far have failed to cooperate: forest 
communities interested in selecting logging, and forest 
businesses who are either legal or willing to transition 
towards legality. 
• able to interact productively with the enabling inter-
vening variables in order to generate the desired 
outcomes. One example might be the identification 
of all legislation and regulations that can enhance 
community land titling (an example that illustrates the 
importance of Step 1, identifying a knowledge broker, 
and Step 5, the effective scoping of knowledge on the 
identified problem). 
Accurately identifying the intervening variables and 
evaluating their effects is thus essential to nurturing durable 
outcomes. By way of illustration: a policy for community 
land titling that lacks durability would be one that is continu-
ously thwarted by intervening variables such as a political 
culture that lacks transparency or which is characterized by 
corruption, and legislation that favours the private property 
rights sought by big business over and above community land 
rights. A durable policy, by contrast, is one that is able to 
catalyse transformative impact (e.g. hitherto elitist political 
institutions become more transparent and open, there is a 
crackdown on corruption, and laws that inhibit community 
land titling are changed to permit greater recognition of 
community land rights).
For ease of graphical representation the various interven-
ing variables in Figure 1 are shown on separate and parallel 
tracks. In practice, however, they may interact. For example, 
in Peru the limited reach of the state in many forested regions 
intersects with criminal practices to undermine legality. 
In many remote forest regions the state has a weak presence 
and is unable to enforce the law, a problem compounded 
by the recent decentralisation of government in Peru, with 
regional governments lacking the financial resources of 
central government. This provides an environment within 
which corrupt practices can flourish, with some state officials 
susceptible to bribes from organised illegal loggers.
While this framework has been designed following our 
work on legality verification in Peru, it is applicable to a broad 
range of problems on which the policy learning protocol 
can be brought to bear. It should be modified according to 
local contingencies by actors working with Steps 6 and 7 of 
the protocol. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
We applied Cashore and Lupberger’s policy learning protocol 
through a shared conviction that scholarship must engage 
with environmental and human rights issues and offer the 
possibility of social change to address injustices. Our aim is 
modest but important. We explore the potential in moving 
beyond a narrow state-centric focus, whereby governments 
continuously make commitments at the international level 
that domestic actors are then expected to implement, by 
exploring creative new ways for harnessing existing interna-
tional instruments to meet locally-defined objectives. Based 
on the four pathways of influence, the protocol offers an 
innovative framework both for analysing policy change in 
the past and, more crucially, for inspiring the actions that can 
enhance the effectiveness of existing international policy 
instruments and generate durable changes. Our aim is to yield 
added value by assessing whether – and if so when and 
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how – international forest policy instruments might be drawn 
on by those seeking to generate durable policy change. 
In contrast to historical multistakeholder dialogues that 
are designed to foster compromise rather than problem solv-
ing, we recommend that future applications of the protocol 
begin by directly addressing power in the problem definition 
(Step 2), and continue thereafter to engage stakeholders with 
the issue of power. One way this can happen is to ask stake-
holders to assess how power dynamics are embedded in a 
policy instrument choice, such as legality verification. This, 
in turn, may help stakeholders to distinguish those cases in 
which they might harness powerful interests to build durable 
results, rather than having problem definitions challenged and 
changed by the powerful. In other words, the protocol could 
integrate power more explicitly in all steps, leading stake-
holder to deliberate on how interrogating power dynamics 
might shed light on how operationalisation of the protocol 
may have different implications for different actors. The civil 
society actors that contest forest policy have scarce resources, 
and need to ensure that they direct their efforts at those inter-
ventions that will yield the best results. Resource optimisation 
requires that actors combine and deploy their human, finan-
cial and technical resources in an optimal ‘mix’ that maxi-
mizes the likelihood of the desired strategic change being 
realised. Actors promoting community tenure rights need to 
concentrate on finding, creating or enlarging the political 
space within which they can exert influence, matching their 
scarce resources to the available options for action, bearing in 
mind the opportunity costs involved of pursuing one course of 
action rather than another, and taking into account the local 
realities that may impede or enhance change through the 
four pathways of influence. The application of the protocol 
will enable actors to weigh the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of different options. 
The pilot application suggests that the protocol has con-
siderable promise in two important and interrelated respects: 
theory and practice. This reflects our conviction as a project 
team that we are not only social scientists working with a 
range of theories – including from policy studies, political 
theory, international relations, sociology and, of course, 
forestry – but also socially-situated actors who wish to use our 
agency as scholars and citizens to ‘make a difference’ for 
peoples and environments. Through piloting the protocol we 
were able to generate both theoretical refinements, in particu-
lar on the concept of durability, as well as original policy-
related proposals for using LV systems in Peru to promote 
community land rights. Our work thus reflects the iterative 
relationship between theory and practice, whereby the 
creative development and application of theory can inspire 
original policy ideas, and the testing of such ideas with stake-
holders and policy makers in turn stimulates further theoreti-
cal innovation and improvement. In this respect the piloting 
of the protocol can, so far at least, be considered a qualified 
success. However, the real test will come with time and 
will depend on how well the application and further develop-
ment of the protocol is able to catalyse durable outcomes in 
relation to the social and environmental problems it sets out 
to address.
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Appendix 1 Interviewees, Lima, Peru, 9–11 March 2016 
Code Date Format Details
A 9 March 2016 Interview Campaigner, Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)
B 9 March 2016 Interview Independent forest consultant
C 9 March 2016 Interview Senior official, Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP) 
[Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest]*
D 10 March 2016 Interview University researcher, Instituto de Cencias de la Naturaleza Territorio y Energia 
Renovales (INTE), Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru (PUCP) [Institute of 
the Sciences of Natural Landscapes and Renewable Energy, Pontifical Catholic 
University of Peru]
E 10 March 2016 Interview Senior official, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
[German Corporation for International Development]
F 11 March 2016 Round table 
discussion
Three senior officials, Organismo de Supervisión de los Recursos Forestales y de 
Fauna Silvestre (OSINFOR) [Supervisory Body of Forest Resources and Wildlife]*
G 11 March 2016 Round table 
discussion
Five senior officials, Ministerio del Ambiente (MINAM) [Ministry of the 
Environment]*
Notes
* Interviews and meetings with simultaneous Spanish-English and English-Spanish translation. (All other interviews were conducted in 
English.)
Two members of the project team (de Jong and Humphreys) were present at all meetings, aided by a PhD student (Marieke Van der Zon). 
For G a third project team member attended (Sarah Lupberger, on secondment to MINAM).
